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[L. A. No. 21714. In Bank. Feb. 7, 1951.] 
HENRY RUINELLO, Appellant ~. DOROTHY CLUNE 
MURRAY, Respondent. 
[11 Frauds. Statute of-Estoppel to Assert.-A party to all oral 
contract cannot be estcpped Lo rely 011 the statute of frauds 
unless nonenforcement of the contract would result in unjust 
enrichment to him, or unconscionablf' injury to the other party. 
[2&, 2b] id.-Pleading Matter in Avoidance.-In an action for 
damages for breach of an oral employment contract within the 
atatute of frauds. an allegation that plaintiff gave up u 
"permanent life-time position" to work for defendant, not 
coupled with a further allegation of special consideration or 
terms to take thl' contract out of the rule that such employ-
ment is terminable at the will of either party, does not show 
that plaintifi will suffer an unconscionable injury ill leaving 
such employment for onl' which is likewise terminable at the 
will of either party so as to estop defendant from relying upon 
the statute of frauds. 
is) Master and Servant-Contracts of EmploJDlent-Duration.-
Ordinarily a contract for permanent employment, life employ-
ment, for so long as the (·mployee chooses, or for other terms 
indicating permanent eUIJlIIoyment, is interpreted as a contract 
for an indefinite period terminable at the will of either party, 
unless it is based on some consideration other than the services 
to be rendered. 
[4] Frauds. Statute of-Pleading Matter in A~oida.nce.-In an 
action for damages for breach c.f an oral employment contract 
within the statute of frauds, and for an accounting of the 
gross proceeds, in which plaintiff, by the contract, had a per-
centage bonus interest, an allegation that the gross income 
of defendant's building was substantially inereased as a result 
of plaintiff's efiorts, not coupled with an allegation tha. the 
re8.!!onable value of plaintiff's services was greater than the 
salary he was paid while working for defendant, does not 
show that defendant will be unjustly enriched if the contract 
is not enforced. 
tIl See 10 Cal.Jur. 644; 49 Am.Jur. 888. 
fSl Uuration of contract purporting to be for permanent em-
plOYUltlllt, note. S5 A.L.R. 1432. Validity and duration of contract 
purporting to be for )t'Tmanent employment, note, 135 A..L.R. 646. 
See, also, 16 Cal.Jur. 977; 35 Am.Jur. 460. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Frll.uJ~ Statute of, § 59; [2, 4] 
Frauds, Statute of, § 63; L3] Master aI£<1 St:rvant, § 27; [6] Plead-
ille• § 103,4). 
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[6] Pleading-Demurrer to Complaint-Amendment After Demur· 
nr Sustained.-Where three successive amended complaints 
have been vnlnerable to demurrer on the same ground, the 
eourt may reasonably conclude that the complaint is incapable 
of being amended to state 8 cause of action, and does not 
abuse its discretion in sustaining a demurrer to the third , 
amended complaint without leave to amend. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Los Angelea County. William B MeKesson. Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for wrongful discharge from employ· 
ment, and for an accounting Judgment for defendant pur. 
suant to order sustaining demurrer to third amended com· 
plaint without leave to amend, affirmed. 
Seymour D. Sommer for Appellant. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Frederic H. Sturdy and John 1':' 
Pigott, Jr., for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dis-
missal entered after a demurrer to his third amended com· 
plaint was sustained without leave to amend. 
Plaintiff aUeges that in October, 1945. he and defendant 
entered into an oral agreement whereby in consideratioll of -
plaintiff's giving up 8 "permanent life-time position" with 
another employer as engineer and superintendent of the 834 
South Broadway Building and taking a similar position with 
defendant, the owner of the Ninth and Broadway Buildin~ 
in Los Angeles, for the term of five years, defendant would 
pay plaintiff a monthly salary of $350 plus 8 yearly bonus 
of 20 per cent of the gross income in excess of $114.000; that 
plaintiff had been continuously employed as engineer and 
superintendent of the 834 South Broadway Buildin~ since 
its erection in 1926 until October, 1945. wht'n he resigned to 
enter the employ of deft'ndant; that plaintiff was persollally 
acquainted with defendant for 20 years and had been previ. 
ously employed by defendant's deceased husband and by 
defendant, who were lessees of 834 South Broadway Building 
from 1933 to 1943; that plaintiff was employt'd by defendant 
from December 1, 1945. to February 21, 1948. when defendant 
summarily discharged him to avoid paymt'nt of thf' bonus; 
that durin~ tht' pt'riod plaintiff work I'd for dpft'lldllllt he was 
able to incrt:ase the lUWual groSli .income of the building to 
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approximately $263,000. Plaintiff seeks recovery of $11,050, 
the sum he would have been entitled to receive as Ilalary 
during the remainder of the employment agreement. Be also 
prays for an accounting of the gross profits and for judgmeut 
for 20 per cent of the yearly gross profits in excess of $114.000. 
Defendant demurred to plaintiff's original complaint on 
tbe ground that the oral agreement, admittedly not to be 
performed within one year, was within the statute of frauds. 
(Civ. Code, § 16240); Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(1).) The 
trial court sustained the demurrer to the original complaint 
as well as the demurrE'r to thE' amenliE'd complaint. Plaintiff, 
by stipulation. folJoWE'd hll~ sE'cond amended complaint with 
a third amended complaint to whIch a demurrer was sustained 
without leave to amend. 
[l)PJaintifi' contE'nd" that he bas alleged sufficient facts 
to estop defendant from TE'lying on the statute of frauds. 
There can be no E'stoppel nnless plaintiff will su1fer on· 
conscionable injury or dE'fE'nollnt will be unjustly enriched 
if thE' oral contract. -is not E'llforced. (Monarco v. LoOreco, 
35 Cal.2d 621. 623·624 1220 P .2d 737) and cases there cited.) 
Plaintiff bas not alleged facts that meet either of these 
conditions. 
[2a) To stat.e a ~ause of action based on unconscionable 
injury it is not enougb to allege that plaintiff gave up 
existing employment to work for defendant. (Murdock v. 
Swanson, 85 Cal.App.2d 380. 385 [193 P.2d 81]; 8tafKUng v. 
Morosco, 43 Cal.App_ 244. 248 [184 P. 954].) Be must set 
forth his rights under the contract given up and show that 
they were so valuable that unconscionable injury would result 
from refusing to enforcE' the oral contract with defendant 
(See, e.g. Seymour v. Oelnr.hs, 156 Cal. 782, 792 [106 P. 88, 
134 Am.St.Rep. 154]. Tuck v. O"dnason, 11 Cal.App.2d 
626,627.628 [54 P.2d 88J ; cf. Wilk v. VinciU, 30 Cal.2d 104, 
105-107 [180 P.20 351].) Plaintiff alleges that he resigned 
8 "permanent life·timt' pORition" under an oral contract 
witb another employer to enter defendant'. employ. This 
allegation does not show tbat plaintiff will sufter an un-
eonRcionable injury if the oral contraet with defendant is 
not enforced. [3) Ordinarily a contract for permanent 
employment. for life emploympnt. for so long as the employee 
chooses, or for other terms indicating prrmanent employment, 
is interprt'teo 8R a contract for an initpnnite period terminable 
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tion other than the services to be rendered. (Speegle v. 
of Fire Underwriters,29 Cal.2d 34, 39 [172 P.2d 867] ; 
v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 601·603 [22 P. 1126,15 Am. 
82] I Shuler v. Corl, 39 Cal.App. 195, 197·198 [178 P. 535] ; 
cases collected in 35 A.L.R. 1432; 135 A.L.R. 646.) (2b] 
plaintiff has not alleged such consideration or other 
indicating a contrary intention, it cannot be concluded 
the employment he gave up was not at the will of either pa 
The leaving of such employment for employment with 
fendant that is also terminable at the will ot either party . 
because of the statute of frauds does not result in unconscion· 
able injury. (Murdock v. Swanson, supra; Standing v. Mo· 
rosco, supra.) 
[4] Nor are there allegations of facts showing that defend-
lIut wil1 be unjustly enriched if the contract is not enforced. 
Although plaintiff alleges that the gross income of defendant's 
building was substantially increased as a result of his efforts, . 
he does not· allege that the reasonable value of his services 
was greater than the $350 a month he was paid while workmg 
for defendant. No unjust enrichment results when the promi- .... 
see has received the reasonable value of his services. If 
the salary he received under the oral contract was not 
equivalent of the reasonable value of his services, an action in 
quantum meruit for that value would prevent any unjust 
enrichment of defendant. (See Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 
2d 621, 625 [220 P.2d 737]; Long v. Rumsey,12 Cal.2d 334, 
342 [84 P.2d 146]; Restatement, Contracts, § 355, TIlustra-
tion 1.) . 
(IS] Although the deficiencies in plaintiff's complaints 
were raised in defendant's demurrers, after three attempts 
he bas not overcome them. The trial court could reasonably 
I'onclude that he was unable to do so, and accordingly, it did 
f10t abuse its discretion in sustaining the demurrer to the third 
~l'llPl1ded complaint without leave to amend. (Wing v. Forest 
I awn Cemetery Assn., 15 Cal.2d 472, 485 [101 P.2d 1099, 
130 A.L.R. 120] ; Dukes v. Kellogg, 127 Cal. 563, 565 [60 P. 
441; Werner v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 65 Cal.App.2d 
667. 673 [151 P.2d 308]; Thayer v. Magill, 13 Cal.App.2d 
2].27 [55 P.2d 1272]; Whittemore v. Davis, 112 Cal.App. 702, 
708-709 [297 P. 640].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C .• 1 .. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
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CARTER, J., Dissenting.-In my opinion the complaint 
sets forth circumstances showing that plaintiff will suf'Ier 
an unconscionable injury if the oral contract with defendant 
is not enforced. It is alleged that plaintiff had been con-
tinuously employed as engineer and superintendent of the 
834 South Broadway Building in the city of Los Angeles 
from the time it was erected in 1926 until October 14, 1945; 
that at the latter date plaintiff was employed under an oral 
agreement with the owner of the building, Aaron Weinrallb, 
whereby plaintiff had a permanent lifetime job; that plaintiff 
resigned this position at the request of defendant and in 
reliance upon an oral agreement with defendant; that the 
latter agreement provided that defendant would pay plaintiff 
a monthly salary and a yearly bonus in consideration of 
plaintiff's giving up his position with Weinraub and taking 
a similar position with defendant, the owner of the Ninth 
and Broadway Building, for a term of five years; that plaintiff 
took over his duties as superintendent and engineer of the 
defendant's building on December 1, 1945, and performed 
such duties until February 21, 1948, when defendant dis-
charged plaintiff without cause to avoid the payment of the 
bonus to which plaintiff was entitled. 
The holding of the majority that the foregoing allegations 
do not state facts which estop defendant from relying upon 
the statute of frauds is based upon the proposition that a 
"permanent lifetime position" ordinarily means merely an 
employment for an indefinite period which is terminable at 
the will of either pa:r:ty and Murdock v. Swanson, 85 Cal.App. 
2d 380 [193 P.2d 81}, and Standing v. Morosco, 43 Ca1.App. 
244 [184 P. 954]. are cited as authority for the conclusion 
that "The leaving of such employment for employment with 
defendant that is also terminable at the will of either party 
because of the statute of frauds does not result in unconscion-
able injury. " 
The complaint in the Standing case alleged that the plain-
tiff, at the defendant's request, gave up his employment and 
sold his home and furniture in New York and moved to Los 
Angeles in order to enter the defendant's employ in the latter 
city. The decision that a cause of action based upon an un-
conscionable injury had not been stated appears to have been 
based upon an erroneous conception of the proper constru<.'tion 
of the pleadings. (See Cod!> Civ. Proc.. § 452; Speegle v. 
Board of Fire Underwriters. 29 Ca1.2d 34,42 [172 P.2d 867] ; 
) 
) 
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Buxbom v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 535, 542 [145 P.2d 805].) From 
the premise that •• Assuming against the pleader, as we must, 
a~l facts reasonably consistent with the facts alleged, but ad-
verse to the plaintiff," (43 Cal.App. at 248) the court con-
cluded that no serious detriment to the plaintiff would result 
from its refusal to enforce the contract with the defendant. 
It was surmised that perhaps the plaintiff had sold his 
property in New York at a profit and that possibly he p~"; 
ferred to live among the ranks of the unemployed in Los ' 
Angeles. Directly contrary to that decision on substantially i 
similar facts is Kaye v. Melzer, 87 Cal.App.2d 299 [197 P.2d 
60J. 
Even if it be assumed that the result reached in the Standing 
case was proper on the ground that sufficient facts had not 
been set forth with regard to the New York employment 
which had been given up, the complaint in the present case is 
not deficient in that respect. As stated above, plaintiff alleged 
that he had been continuously employed for 19 years in his 
previous position with the 834 South Broadway Building and 
that this employment was to continue at least indefinitely. 
Murdock v. Swanson, mpra, was an action upon an oral 
____ .. . .. contract..tomake a will. The complaint alleged that the plain-
tiff had sold her business in order to devote her time to 
performing services for the decedent. In holding that facts . 
were noi alleged which indicated that a serious change of 
position had taken place, it was said that the alle~ation with 
regard to the plaintiff having sold her business was insuffi-
cient because it was not asserted that the decedent requested 
or knew of the sale. (But see Wilk v. Vencill, 80 Cal.2d 104, 
108 [180 P .2d 851), where this requirement is repudiated; 
see, also, Tuck v. Gudnason, 11 Cal.App.2d 626 [54 P.2d 88].) 
Again, even if the Murdock case merits approval on its facts, 
it furnishes no precedent for the present case. It is alleged 
here in considerable detail that plaintiff gave up his prior 
employment at the request of defendant. 
The fact that plaintiff's employment agreement with Wein-
raub may have been terminable at will does not compel the 
conclusion that he will not suffer serious detriment if his 
contract with defendant is not enforced. In the first place, 
it is, I submit, a matter of common knowledge that one who 
has heen employed in the same position for a number of years 
has performed satisfactory services, enjoys the good will of 
hil'l employer, and will not ordinarily be discharged without· 
good cause. In this respect plaintiff's change of position waa 
) 
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not materially dUIerent from that involved in 8,,,mour T. 
Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782 [106 P. 88,184 Am.St.Rep.154]. While 
plaintiff's rights under his contract of employment with 
Weinraub may not have been as definitely defined as those 
fixed by the former contract of the plaintiff in the Seymour 
case, yet in a very real sense plaintiff has given up substantially 
the same thing. 
The decisions holding that an action to recover damages 
may be predicated upon an intentional and unjustifiable 
interference with a contract terminable at will (Speegle v. 
Boardo! Fire Underwriters, supra, 29 Cal.2d 34, 39-40, and 
cases cited; Romano v. Wilbur Ellis & Co., 82 Ca1.App.2d 670, 
673 [186 P.2d 1012] ; see Prosser, Torts, pp. 981·982) indicate 
that the loss of such a contract does involve a serious detri-
ment. Particularly is this true with respect to employment 
contracts-the means by which the great majority of people 
earn a living. Thus, the severe individual hardships resulting 
from unemployment and the national problems thereby cre· 
ated were recognized by Congress in enacting the Social 
Security Act of 1935. (Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 
U.S. 548, 586-587 [57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279, 109 A.L.R. 
1293].) That the giving up of employment of long duration, 
as is here alleged, is n~t a matter of great importance to the 
employee, and a serious change of position on his part, is, 
in my opinion, a highly unrealistic conclusion. 
The majority opinion cites W ilk v. Veneill, 30 Cal.2d 104 
[180 P.2d 351], as an example of the showing necessary to 
establish an estoppel to rely upon the statute of frauds. The 
only substantial cham'.!' of position there was that the plaintiff 
gave up an opportunity to purchase another house in the 
neighborhood in reliance upon the defendant wife's oral 
consent to an agreement to sel1 the defendants' house to the 
plaintiff, it being al1eged that there were no other houses 
available in the vicinity. If such a comparatively slight in-
convenience or the mere loss of a desirable opportunity, rather 
than the termination of an agreement relating to one's very 
means of livelihood, is the proper test of unconscionable in· 
jury, then plaintiff has also brought himself within that rule. 
The complaint alleges that plaintiff informed defendant in 
September, 1945, that he planned to remain on his job at the 
834 South Broadway Building for another five years, at which 
time he expected to retire; "that the defendant then stated 
to the plaintiff that if he desired to work for five years only 
that would be agreeable to her and that if he would accept the 
I 
/ 
694: COUNTY OF Los ANGELES t1. BYBAK 
position (with defendant) they could both retire at the end 
five years." From the additional allegations that 
resigned his position with Weinraub and accepted d" .. c ... u.<lUL 
offer and that plaintiff was discharged by defendant in l"elnr11I..-~31!!1 
ary, 1948, it is evident that Ruinello's pian to retire in 
has been frustrated if the oral contract with defendant 
not to be enforced, just as the desire of the plaintiff WUk 
acquire a home in one neighborhood would have been 
trated if his ora) agreement had not been enforced. ._ 
In my opinion the change of position alleged here is at 
least as serious as those involved in Wilk v. Vencm, su1Wa.,·:'.l· .. · 
Vierra v. Pereira, 12 Ca1.2d 629 [86 P.2d 816J, Wt'lson V."', 
Bailey, 8 Ca1.2d 416 [65 P.2d 770], Frey v. Corbin, 84 Cal.': 
App.2d 536 [191 P.2d 21], Beverly Hills Nat. Bank v. 8ere8, ' 
76 Cal.App.2d 255 [172 P.2d 894], and Holstrom v. Mullen,] 
84 Cal.App. 1 [257 P. 545]. ~ 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment."'" 
-/ 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 8, , 
1951. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. ..~ 
